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Human replicas may elicit unintended cold, eerie feelings in viewers, an effect known as the uncanny val-
ley. MasahiroMori, who proposed the effect in 1970, attributed it to inconsistencies in the replica’s realism
with some of its features perceived as human and others as nonhuman. This study aims to determine
whether reducing realism consistency in visual features increases the uncanny valley effect. In three
rounds of experiments, 548 participants categorized and rated humans, animals, and objects that varied
from computer animated to real. Two sets of features were manipulated to reduce realism consistency.
(For humans, the sets were eyes–eyelashes–mouth and skin–nose–eyebrows.) Reducing realism consis-
tency caused humans and animals, but not objects, to appear eerier and colder. However, the predictions
of a competing theory, proposed by Ernst Jentsch in 1906, were not supported: The most ambiguous rep-
resentations—those eliciting the greatest category uncertainty—were neither the eeriest nor the coldest.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. The problem of the uncanny valley and its significance
The uncanny valley hypothesis predicts a negative emotional
appraisal of human replicas that appear or behave not quite
human. This appraisal is typically attributed to the perceived sal-
ience of their nonhuman features (MacDorman, Srinivas, & Patel,
2013; Mitchell et al., 2011). Mori (1970/2012) graphs the uncanny
valley as a dip in an otherwise positive relation between human
likeness and affinity. He illustrates the concept with androids,
moving corpses and mannequins, prosthetic arms, and a robot
whose smile turns creepy when formed at half speed. All these
examples combine human and nonhuman features, causing cold,
eerie feelings in viewers. More recently scholars and film critics
have related the uncanny valley to viewers’ dyspathy for three-
dimensional (3D) computer-animated heroes that closely resemble
real people (Butler & Joschko, 2009; Freedman, 2012; cf. Mars
Needs Moms, 2011, A Christmas Carol, 2009, Beowulf, 2007, The Polar
Express, 2004, and Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within, 2001). Some
viewers fail to identify with the characters, experiencing them
instead as soulless or vacant.
Although the uncanny valley has been empirically investigated
since 2005, the hypothesis remains controversial. Some studieshave been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis (e.g., in human
adults, Burleigh, Schoenherr, & Lacroix, 2013; Ho, MacDorman, &
Pramono, 2008; MacDorman, Green, Ho, & Koch, 2009; Mitchell
et al., 2011; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007; Tinwell, Grimshaw, &
Abdel Nabi, 2015; Tinwell, Grimshaw, Abdel Nabi, & Williams,
2011; in children, Tinwell & Sloan, 2014; in infants, Lewkowicz &
Ghazanfar, 2012; Matsuda, Okamoto, Ida, Okanoya, & Myowa-
Yamakoshi, 2012; and in other primates, Steckenfinger &
Ghazanfar, 2009). Other studies have instead been interpreted as
supporting alternative hypotheses (e.g., an uncanny cliff,
Bartneck, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2007, or wall, Tinwell,
Grimshaw, & Williams, 2011; uncanniness caused by attributions
of experience, Gray & Wegner, 2012; or a correlation between per-
ceptual discrimination difficulty and positive affect, Cheetham,
Suter, & Jäncke, 2014). Still other studies have found support for
the uncanny valley hypothesis but not for Mori’s (1970/2012)
hypothesis that movement amplifies its effect (Piwek, McKay, &
Pollick, 2014; Thompson, Trafton, & McKnight, 2011).
Theories to explain the uncanny valley are not lacking. They
range from the biological to the cultural (reviewed in
MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a,
2006b; MacDorman, Vasudevan, & Ho, 2009; Pollick, 2010). Rather,
evidence is insufficient to decide among them. For example, Mori
(1970/2012) proposed that the uncanny valley effect is a survival
instinct, an aversive response to proximal threats like dead or
diseased bodies and dangerous species of animals. We have further
developed Mori’s survival instinct hypothesis by relating the
K.F. MacDorman, D. Chattopadhyay / Cognition 146 (2016) 190–205 191uncanny valley to the detection and avoidance of potential vectors
of infection or of infertile or less fit mates (e.g., Neanderthals,
MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a,
2006b; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009; Moosa & Ud-Dean,
2010). We have also proposed the uncanny valley may result from
inconsistency in the realism of an anthropomorphic entity’s fea-
tures (MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan,
et al., 2009). Perhaps the earliest explanation of uncanniness in
human-looking entities is category uncertainty, in particular
uncertainty about whether an entity is real or human (Jentsch,
1906/1997).
This study experimentally examines whether the uncanny
valley effect is increased by category uncertainty (Burleigh &
Schoenherr, 2014; Burleigh et al., 2013; Green, MacDorman, Ho,
& Vasudevan, 2008; Jentsch, 1906/1997; Kang, 2009;
MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009; Yamada, Kawabe, & Ihaya,
2013) or, as an alternative theory, by realism inconsistency
(MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009; Meah & Moore, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2011; Moore, 2012).
Category uncertainty denotes an inability to determine the cate-
gory to which an entity belongs, such as whether a face is that of
a real human being or a 3D computer model. Realism inconsistency
denotes a mismatch in the realism of an entity’s features, such as
some facial features appearing human and others nonhuman
(e.g., computer-animated skin paired with real eyes and mouth).
We chose to evaluate category uncertainty and realism inconsis-
tency theories because of their prominence in the literature on
the uncanny valley.
1.2. Category uncertainty theories
1.2.1. Categorical perception
Although Mori proposed the uncanny valley in 1970, Jentsch, as
early as 1906, developed a theory identifying category uncertainty
as the cause of uncanniness (Jentsch, 1906/1997; MacDorman &
Ishiguro, 2006a). He asserts that eerie feelings are most reliably
elicited by uncertainty about whether an entity is inanimate or
animate, or whether it is nonhuman or human. Category uncer-
tainty occurs whenever an entity transitions from one category
to another, qualitatively distinct category by a quantitative
metric—for example, a fertilized ovum transitioning to a person by
the metric developmental chronology (Ramey, 2005). Mori’s
(1970/2012) graph depicts industrial robot transitioning to healthy
person by the metric human likeness. Owing to categorical percep-
tion, small changes along the continuum between two categories
should appear much larger than equal-sized changes within either
category (Beale & Keil, 1995; Campbell, Pascalis, Coleman, Wallace,
& Benson, 1997; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Harnad, 1987; Iverson &
Kuhl, 1995). This phenomenon is also known as the perceptual
magnet effect (Feldman, Griffiths, & Morgan, 2009). Near the
category boundary, the increased salience of these changes could
make them jarring. Categorical perception has been found on a
continuum from 3D computer models to photographs of real peo-
ple (Cheetham, Pavlovic, Jordan, Suter, & Jäncke, 2013; Cheetham,
Suter, & Jäncke, 2011; Looser & Wheatley, 2010). Beyond the
effects of categorical perception, transitions along nonhuman–
human continua could be disturbing because they undermine the
separation between what we identify as us (e.g., human, person)
and what we identify as not us (e.g., 3D model, robot, ovum;
MacDorman & Entezari, 2015; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009; Ramey, 2005).
1.2.2. Cognitive dissonance
The negative emotional appraisal of the uncanny valley has
been identified with psychological discomfort caused by a conflictbetween the belief that an entity is human and the belief that the
same entity is not human (Hanson et al., 2005; MacDorman, Green,
et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009; Tondu & Bardou,
2011). If nonhuman and human are conceived as distinct and mutu-
ally exclusive categories, entities whose appearance gradually
transitions from nonhuman to human, as in Mori’s (1970/2012)
graph, must cross a category boundary. An entity crossing the
boundary could at once elicit two mutually exclusive concepts
(Moore, 2012)—or even oscillate between them as its appearance
changes. Repeated nonconscious elicitation and conscious suppres-
sion of the concept human could interfere with empathy
(Misselhorn, 2009).
1.2.3. Categorization difficulty
Another explanation of the uncanny valley effect is that diffi-
culty in categorizing ambiguous entities results in the formation
of negative impressions (Yamada et al., 2013). Thus, categorization
difficulty predicts that the most ambiguous representations are
perceived as the least likeable. Categorization difficulty (i.e., low
processing fluency) is operationalized as longer response times
during a categorization task.
1.2.4. Limited investigation of category uncertainty
Although the categorical perception of entities lying on a
human likeness or animacy continuum has been established (e.g.,
Cheetham et al., 2011; Looser & Wheatley, 2010), the effect of cat-
egorical perception on the viewer’s emotional appraisal of an
entity was examined only recently (Yamada et al., 2013). In
Yamada and colleagues’ study, intermediate morphs between a
real, hand-drawn, and stuffed-toy human face elicited the longest
categorization latency and the lowest ratings of likeability.
The study, however, is not without limitations. First, it does not
directly examine the uncanny valley in the domains where it is
typically identified: humanoid robotics and 3D computer anima-
tion. Second, the study does not rule out a potential extraneous
cause of negative emotional appraisals of ambiguous representa-
tions: morphing artifacts from feature misalignment (cf. in Fig. 2
of Yamada et al., 2013, one face has two noses). Third, the findings
do not indicate whether the faces were uncanny, because the only
dependent variable measured was likeability. Fourth, operational-
izing the y-axis of Mori’s graph as likeability could have con-
founded it with the x-axis of human likeness because these
measures are highly correlated (e.g., r = .73, p < .001, in Ho &
MacDorman, 2010).
Cheetham et al. (2014) were unable to find support for the cat-
egorization difficulty theory. Unfortunately, the only dependent
variable measured was subjective familiarity.
1.3. Realism inconsistency theory
To explain the uncanny valley effect, we have developed an
alternative theory to category uncertainty—realism inconsistency.
Realism inconsistency theory predicts that features at inconsistent
levels of realism in an anthropomorphic entity cause perceptual
processes in viewers to make conflicting inferences regarding
whether the entity is real. Such inconsistency could violate neu-
rocognitive expectancies, resulting in large feedback error signals
(Friston, 2010; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro,
Driver, & Frith, 2012). Prediction error could lead to a negative
emotional appraisal and avoidance behavior (Cheetham et al.,
2011; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a, 2006b). Prior research has
found inconsistent realism in an entity’s features increases
reported eeriness (e.g., in eyes and skin, MacDorman, Green,
et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009; or in voice and
appearance, Mitchell et al., 2011).
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The realism inconsistency theory predicts viewers will
experience cold, eerie feelings when perceiving anthropomorphic
entities that have features at different levels of realism. An artifact
that is designed to appear human but fails to be indistinguishable
from human in every feature is likely to have features that are
inconsistent in their level of realism, because any discrepancy from
human was unintended and thus beyond the designer’s control.
Therefore, computer-animated characters—or android robots—that
are recognizable as such are inherently realism inconsistent.
A potential source of cold, eerie feelings in perceiving an entity
that possesses both human and nonhuman features is category
prediction error, which could have several potential causes: (a)
human morphological features elicit neurocognitive expectances
of behavioral responses that align with human norms; these
expectancies are then violated (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a,
2006b); (b) the brain’s categorizations of the entity’s features con-
flict when they are integrated during the perception and recogni-
tion of the entity as a whole—for example, human appearance
coupled with nonbiological movement in an android, or living
appearance coupled with coldness or stiffness in an embalmed
body; (c) the human features may be processed by brain areas that
are rapid, efficient, and specialized, such as the fusiform face area
or the extrastriate body area, while the nonhuman features may
be processed by brain areas that are slower and more general; this
results in competition among brain areas (cf. Hanson et al., 2005;
James et al., 2015); (d) if some features are processed more rapidly
than others, information flows that are typically integrated simul-
taneously in the perception of the whole entity could lag; and
(e) the ‘overtraining’ of neural networks for human face and body
recognition through a lifetime of exposure to other people could
sensitize them to even small deviations from human norms. Thus,
based on (a) to (e), nonhuman features in a humanlike entity could
elicit large feedback error signals, measurable as increased activity
in the cortical hierarchy (Saygin et al., 2012).1.3.2. Differences from Jentsch’s theory
Jentsch attributes uncanniness to a person’s general doubt
about what something is (e.g., is it human or nonhuman?). The
source of doubt could simply be missing information, such as when
darkness obscures an object. Realism inconsistency theory instead
attributes uncanniness to conflicting—not missing—perceptual
cues, which cause prediction error in or between brain areas
engaged in automatic, stimulus-driven perceptual processing
(Moore, 2012; Pollick, 2010; Saygin et al., 2012). Thus, the origin
of the eerie feeling could be preconscious and subpersonal.1.3.3. Differences from cognitive dissonance
Given that perceptual prediction error can occur without
engaging the perceiver’s reflection and deliberation, the realism
inconsistency theory differs from cognitive dissonance in which
conflicting beliefs are aligned by deliberately adjusting them
(Bell, 1967; Gawronski & Strack, 2004). Moreover, the uncanny
valley has by definition the experiential qualities of the uncanny;
it involves a characteristic range of affective and other responses,
from uneasiness, strangeness, and creepiness to revulsion, fright,
and terror (Mori, 1970/2012). It is associated with, but not
equivalent to, the basic emotions of fear, anxiety, and disgust
(Ho et al., 2008) and may have eeriness and spine-tingling
subfactors (Ho & MacDorman, 2010). By contrast, cognitive
dissonance is psychological discomfort (operationalized as
uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered, Elliot & Devine, 1994). It does
not necessarily lead to the cold, eerie feeling associated with the
uncanny valley.1.3.4. Not a general phenomenon
Contrary to competing theories, the uncanny valley is not a gen-
eral phenomenon like category uncertainty (Burleigh et al., 2013;
Yamada et al., 2013) or cognitive dissonance (Tondu & Bardou,
2011). These phenomena apply to all categories. However, in com-
puter animation, the uncanny is identified with inadequately life-
like human features (e.g., ‘dead eyes’) and human characters (e.g.,
the children, not the train, in The Polar Express, 2004, and the baby,
not the toys, in Tin Toy, 1988; Butler & Joschko, 2009; Freedman,
2012). Likewise, in everyday life people are more disturbed by
lesions and deformities in human beings and their animal cousins
than in less anthropomorphic animals and in plants (e.g., compare
a leprous man with a rusty old train car or a blighted chestnut tree;
MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a,
2006b; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009). Category uncertainty
and cognitive dissonance can only address the uncanny valley if
buttressed by additional constructs (e.g., self-identification). Nev-
ertheless, the above observations are anecdotal and require sys-
tematic examination.
This study focuses on refuting category uncertainty as an expla-
nation of the uncanny valley and offers realism inconsistency as an
alternative. However, realism inconsistency is not meant to offer a
complete explanation. For example, elsewhere we have proposed
that a human replica could inadvertently elicit a threat-
avoidance mechanism, such as a mechanism to prevent intimate
contact with infertile mates or dead and diseased bodies (Ho
et al., 2008; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a, 2006b). Such a mech-
anism could, for example, activate the fear or disgust system
(Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; MacDorman & Entezari, 2015).
1.4. Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are based on the realism inconsistency theory,
which predicts that the uncanny valley effect is caused by an entity
possessing features, not all of which are perceived as belonging to a
real living anthropomorphic being. The uncanny valley effect is not
predicted to be caused by uncertainty about the category to which
an entity belongs. We operationalize the uncanny valley effect as
higher eeriness ratings and lower warmth (vs. coldness) ratings
(Ho & MacDorman, 2010; MacDorman & Entezari, 2015).
From the standpoint of experimental control, it is difficult to
investigate transitions along a human similarity dimension. For
example, there is no particular way that something half camera
and half man should appear, or half bird and half woman. There-
fore, this study investigates animacy (i.e., living vs. inanimate) for
human beings and nonhuman animals and realism (i.e., real vs.
computer-animated) for human beings, nonhuman animals, and
nonanimal objects (hereafter, humans, animals, and objects). The
selection of these two dimensions, animacy and realism, enables
a transition without image artifacts between photographs of real
people, animals, and objects and their 3D computer models.
H1. Category uncertainty does not cause the uncanny valley effect.
H1 is operationalized as follows: The most ambiguous entities
neither elicit the most eeriness nor the least warmth. This is the
negation of the prediction of Yamada et al. (2013), except they only
measured likeability. Both eeriness and warmth are measured
because analogous concepts are stressed in Mori (1970/2012,
viz., bukimi and shinwakan).
Although not a hypothesis in this study, human and animal
models are expected to be eerier and colder than their real
counterparts (MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman,
Vasudevan, et al., 2009). There are at least two explanations of this:
First, the computer modeling process itself introduces extraneous
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facial features appear completely real but achieves it to varying
degrees depending on the particular feature (e.g., because eyes
are harder to model than skin). Second, we have not ruled out
other explanations of why 3D human and animal models elicit
unintended cold, eerie feelings (e.g., by activating a threat-
avoidance mechanism, MacDorman & Entezari, 2015).
H2. Reducing consistency in the realism of features increases the
uncanny valley effect, but only in anthropomorphic entities.
H2 is operationalized as follows: If two sets of features are
manipulated to reduce feature consistency, the entity elicits higher
eeriness and lower warmth than without the manipulation. The
effect is only predicted for high and intermediate levels of anthro-
pomorphism (high: humans, intermediate: animals, and low:
objects). H2 has already been supported by experiments showing
that inconsistency in the human realism of an entity’s features
increases its eeriness (e.g., skin texture and eye texture or size,
MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007; face and voice, Meah & Moore,
2014; Mitchell et al., 2011). Nevertheless, H2 has not been
explored in the context of category uncertainty: It is important
to determine whether uncanny valley effects caused by reduced
consistency in realism can be separated from category uncertainty.
The experiment used in this study presented representations
lying on three transitions from each entity’s 3D computer-
modeled replica (computer animated) to the original (real). For
the control transition, all features were varied uniformly. For this
transition, H2 predicts elicited eeriness to decrease, and warmth
to increase, as representations approach fully real. Eeriness is low-
est, and warmth highest, for fully real representations because they
are also fully consistent in their realism. As shown in Fig. 1, for the
control transition, eeriness is predicted to follow an inverse logistic
function, based on a Bayesian model of the perceptual magnet
effect (Feldman et al., 2009; Moore, 2012). The logistic function
and its inverse have been found to fit eeriness and other evaluative
ratings of humanlike faces along transitions from computer ani-
mated to real (Looser & Wheatley, 2010; Fig. 11 in MacDorman,
Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009). For the
two consistency-reduced transitions, the realism of one set of fea-
tures was increased while the realism of a complementary set of
features was decreased. This manipulation is predicted to increase
eeriness and decrease warmth proportionally to the reduction inOriginal
Ee
rin
es
s
control
transition
consistency-reduced
transitions
effect of consistency
reduction
Computer Modeled
Fig. 1. Representations vary in their feature realism along one control transition
and two consistency-reduced transitions from 3D computer modeled to the
original. For human and animal representations, eeriness is predicted to follow,
on the control transition (black line), an inverse logistic function and, on the
consistency-reduced transitions (gray line), an additive combination of the inverse
logistic function and a Gaussian function (dashed gray line) representing the
increase in eeriness caused by consistency reduction.consistency. The increase in eeriness caused by consistency reduc-
tion is predicted to follow a Gaussian function, based on a Bayesian
model of perceptual tension caused by conflicting cues (Moore,
2012). The Gaussian function has been found to fit eeriness ratings
along other consistency-reduced transitions (Fig. 11, MacDorman,
Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009). For the
consistency-reduced transition, H2 predicts eeriness to follow a
polynomial function—an additive combination of (1) the logistic
function representing eeriness along the control transition and
(2) a Gaussian function representing the increase in eeriness
caused by consistency reduction.
H3. The more anthropomorphic the entity, the more reduced
consistency in feature realism increases the uncanny valley effect.
H3 is operationalized similarly to H2. To investigate whether
the uncanny valley effect is a general phenomenon or specific to
anthropomorphic entities, we compared the effects of reduced
consistency in feature realism at three levels of anthropomorphism
on eeriness and warmth with the expectation of higher eeriness
and lower warmth at higher levels of anthropomorphism. H3 is
suggested by the anecdotal observation that physical defects in
human beings are more disturbing than physical defects in other
species or objects (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a, 2006b).
2. Method
2.1. Design
The experiment follows a within-group design, with unique
participants observing one set of entities (4–5) in each of the three
rounds of experiments. The experiment consists of a two-
alternative forced choice categorization task and a survey in which
the task stimuli are rated.
2.2. Participants
Participantswere recruitedbyelectronicmail froma randomized
exhaustive list of undergraduates attending a Midwestern public
university system. Based on the inclusion criteria, participants
self-reported as fluent or native English speakers, aged 18 or older,
with 20/40 vision or better with correction. Participants received
no compensation. This study was approved by the Indiana Univer-
sity Office of Research Administration (IRB Study No. 1210009909).
A total of 548 participants were recruited. The task stimuli were
distributed among unique participants in three rounds of experi-
ments: In the first round, Zlatko, Ingrid, dog, and parrot were pre-
sented to 224 participants (Mdnage = 21, IQRage = 3, 67% female); In
the second round, Clint, Emelie, Juliana, Simona, and Ferrari were
presented to 181 participants (Mdnage = 21, IQRage = 4, 62% female);
and in the third round, camera, washer, and water lily were
presented to 143 participants (Mdnage = 22, IQRage = 4, 56% female).
Participants reflected the demographics of the university
system’s undergraduate population: 80% non-Hispanic white, 7%
African American, 3% Asian, 3% Hispanic, and 7% foreign or
unclassified. Participants predominantly had no or mild visual
impairment with corrective lenses (Mdn = no impairment), were
right-handed (n = 449, 82%) native English speakers (n = 494,
90%), raised (n = 520, 95%) and residing in the United States
(n = 539, 98%). The three rounds of experiments were conducted
sequentially between February 21, 2013, and March 22, 2014.
2.3. Stimuli
The task stimuli were 600 by 600 pixel images derived frompho-
tographs of 12 entities: six human beings (high anthropomorphism
Humans (Male) Animals
ObjectsHumans (Female)
Computer
Animated vs. Real
Computer
Animated vs. Real
Computer
Animated vs. Real
Computer
Animated vs. Real
Clint Zlatko
Emelie Ingrid
Simona Juliana
Fig. 2. Human beings, nonhuman animals, and nonanimal objects constitute the high, intermediate, and low anthropomorphism groups, respectively. The right half of a
photograph of each entity is shown beside the left half of its 3D computer model.
194 K.F. MacDorman, D. Chattopadhyay / Cognition 146 (2016) 190–205group), two nonhuman animals (intermediate anthropomorphism
group), and four nonanimal objects (low anthropomorphism group).
Fig. 2 shows the right half of the real photographs and the left half
of the 3D computer models developed from those photographs.
The two men are Clint (30s) and Zlatko (80s). The four women are
Emelie (30s), Ingrid (20s), Simona (20s), and Juliana (20s). The
dog is a Saint Bernard, and the parrot is a lovebird. The car is a
Ferrari 599 GTB, the camera is a Nikon D3100, the washingmachine
is a Servis W712F4W, and the flower is a water lily.
Apart from Zlatko, young white people were selected for the
human group to reduce outgroup effects, because the sample
frame was mainly young and white. Simona and Julia were added
to the study to determine whether professional character modeling
and cosmetic artistry could reduce the eeriness of the human com-
puter models relative to their originals. Ingrid was rendered with a
shiny doll-like texture for the same reason. Zlatko was used to
determine whether a very old man could conversely increase the
eeriness of the original relative to the computer model. The hetero-
geneity of the animal and object groups relative to the human
group was intended to represent the diversity of species and
objects in those groups and, thus, enhance the generalizability of
the findings.
The photographs of the people were cropped to show only the
central region of the face, from the eyebrows to the mouth, and a
roughly equivalent region of the animals. This region was selected
to exhibit in detail the most salient features of the face.
The photographs were sourced from 3D.sk, 123rf.com, and a
private collection. The first four computer models of humans were
created by Singular Inversions FaceGen. The remaining models
were created by hand using Autodesk Maya, Pixologic ZBrush,
and Adobe Photoshop.For each of the 12 entities a 3D replica was modeled. Fig. 3
illustrates for humans how a total of 17 representations were
derived from each entity and its computer model: a transition by
sixths from computer model to the original; a transition by thirds
from computer model to computer model with original eyes,
eyelashes, and mouth (upper left) to original; and a transition by
thirds from computer model to original with computer-modeled
eyes, eyelashes, and mouth (lower right) to original. The eyes,
eyelashes, and mouth were selected as the foreground feature set
because of their importance in judgments of animacy (Looser &
Wheatley, 2010). The foreground feature sets for nonhuman
entities are as follows: for the dog, the eyes, mouth, and tongue;
for the parrot, the eyes, eyelids, beak, cere, and left nostril; for
the camera, the lens mount, reflex mirror, and other parts visible
behind the lens; for the car, the headlights and front grilles; for
the washing machine, the door, door handle, and window; for
the flower, the stamen, stigma, and style.
All representations were created by placing a photograph of a
real human, animal, or object on a layer above a render of a pre-
cisely aligned 3D computer model of the same entity and then
varying within the photograph the opacity of regions correspond-
ing to the foreground and background feature set by thirds or
sixths. Because the features of the computer model were aligned
with those of the original, transitions were made without
morphing, solely by changing image opacity.
2.4. Procedure
Participants completed each round of the experiment through
an access-controlled website. Participants’ activities were ordered
as follows: (1) informed consent; (2) a survey used to develop
Fig. 3. The diagonal depicts a consistent change in the objective realism (fraction of real) of all features of an entity, from the 3D model to the original. The lower-right and
upper-left paths depict an inconsistent change in which the objective realism of one feature set (e.g., eyes, eyelashes, and mouth) changed first and then the other (e.g., skin,
nose, and eyebrows).
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graphics survey; (5) task stimuli ratings (see Dependent Variables);
and (6) a debriefing, which explained the purpose and methods of
the study. Based on six test participants, each round was estimated
to require approximately 15–30 min to complete.
The categorization task divides into two blocks, each of which
corresponds to a single dimension: either realism or animacy. For
realism, the task is to categorize the face as either computer
animated or real; and for animacy, as either inanimate or living.
Each of these pairs of anchors was taken from the first item of
the corresponding index of the face survey, described below. The
first two trials of each block are practice trials. There are 136 actual
trials per block (4 entities  17 representations  2 repetitions).
For each participant, block order, trial order, and left–right anchor
order are randomized. Given this study’s lengthy and repetitive
procedures, each participant was exposed to a subset of 3, 4, or 5
of the 12 entities to prevent fatigue effects and attrition.
Potential confounds caused by the presentation of only a subset
of entities were tested and ruled out using a linear mixed-effects
model with entity as a random factor (Supplementary Material,
Section 1). Potential confounds caused by the categorization task
preceding the task stimuli ratings were also tested and ruled out
(Supplementary Material, Section 2). A rationale for the tradeoffsmade in the research design is provided (Supplementary Material,
Section 3).
Each trial begins with the presentation of a task stimulus. To the
left of the stimulus appears an anchor (e.g., real) with the instruc-
tion ‘‘Press e” and to the right the opposing anchor (e.g., computer
animated) with the instruction ‘‘Press i.” Pressing e indicates the
stimulus belongs to the category signified by the anchor on the left
and i for the right. The participant is instructed to categorize the
face as quickly and as accurately as possible. The stimulus remains
visible until one of the following events occurs: The participant
categorizes the stimulus by pressing e for left or i for right, pauses
the task by pressing the spacebar, or allows 3000 ms to elapse.
(A 3000 ms cutoff is used to discourage deliberation.) Next, three
masks are presented in sequence for 100 ms each to suppress the
afterimage of the stimulus: a 19-by-19 checkerboard, a 38-by-38
checkerboard, and a 50% gray panel. If an e or i key press is
registered, the masks serve as a 300-ms intertrial interval, and
the next trial begins. Otherwise, the participant resumes the task
by pressing the spacebar, the stimulus is randomly inserted into
the remaining trials, and the next trial begins. For each trial,
response times (RTs) are recorded as the elapsed time in
milliseconds from the onset of the face stimulus until an e or i
key press is registered.
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Fig. 4. For humans, animals, and objects, the percentage of times the stimulus was categorized as real (vs. computer animated) is plotted against its fraction of real for the
control (diagonal) and reduced-consistency transitions (lower right, upper left). The stimulus whose categorization is closest to 50% is defined as most ambiguous (unfilled
circle) and whose categorization is closest to 0% or 100% most certain (diamond). The error bars in Figs. 4–8 indicate the 95% confidence interval of the true mean.
196 K.F. MacDorman, D. Chattopadhyay / Cognition 146 (2016) 190–205The task representations ratings require each participant to
rate the representations on four dimensions: realism, animacy,
warmth, and eeriness (see Dependent Variables). There were 68
stimuli (4 entities  17 representations) in the first round of the
experiment, 85 stimuli (5 entities  17 representations) in the
second, and 51 (3 entities  17 representations) in the third.2.5. Independent variables
The independent variables are anthropomorphism and fraction
of real. Anthropomorphism has three levels: high for humans,
intermediate for animals, and low for objects. Fraction of real oper-
ationalizes the concept of transition in human realism, a form of
human similarity. Two kinds of transitions were tested: the control
transition (the diagonal in Fig. 3) and the consistency-reduced
transitions. Two kinds of consistency-reduced transitions were
tested: with real foreground feature set at the midpoint (upperleft) and with computer-modeled foreground feature set at the
midpoint (lower right).
Each of these three transitions has seven levels, which are its
fraction of real. These levels enable the objective realism of an
entity to be determined. For the control transition, the levels are
0, ⅙, ⅓, ½, ⅔, ⅚, 1. The fraction indicates the proportion of the
entity that is original (e.g., ⅙ means ⅙ original, ⅚ computer
modeled). For the lower-right consistency-reduced transition, the
foreground–background levels are 0–0, 0–⅓, 0–⅔, 0–1, ⅓–1,
⅔–1, and 1–1, and for the upper-right consistency-reduced transi-
tion, 0–0,⅓–0,⅔–0, 1–0, 1–⅓, 1–⅔, and 1–1. The pairing of control
representations on the diagonal with corresponding consistency-
reduced representations on the upper-left and lower-right
transitions is justified because each control representation is identical
to the average of its paired consistency-reduced transitions.
Because the three transitions shared endpoints, 17 representa-
tions of each entity (5 exclusively belonging to each of the three
transitions and 2 common across all three transitions) were
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Fig. 5. For humans, animals, and objects, eerie ratings of the stimulus are plotted against its fraction of real for the control (diagonal) and consistency-reduced transitions
(lower right, upper left). The dashed vertical line represents the estimate of the most ambiguous stimulus by linear interpolation.
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ratings. This ensured that the shared endpoints were not repeatedly
presented. To minimize habituation the three different transitions
were tested in one block instead of in three isolated blocks.
2.6. Dependent variables
For the real vs. computer animated categorization, the dependent
variables for each stimulus are percentage categorized as real and
response time. For the task stimuli ratings, the dependent variables
are subjective ratings on indices of realism, warmth, and eeriness.
For the living vs. inanimate categorization, which was used only in
the first round of experiments, the dependent variables for each
stimulus are percentage categorized as living and response time.
In addition to realism, warmth, and eeriness, in the first round, task
stimuli were also rated on an animacy index. Each index used three
7-point semantic differential items (i.e., left anchor term, very,mod-
erately, slightly, neutral, slightly, moderately, very, right anchorterm): For realism, computer animated–real, replica–original,
and digitally copied–authentic; for animacy, inanimate–living,
inert–alive, and without definite lifespan–mortal; for warmth,
cold-hearted–warm-hearted, hostile–friendly, and grumpy–cheerful;
for eeriness, ordinary–creepy, plain–weird, and predictable–eerie.
Only three items with large factor loadings were selected from each
of these previously developed indices (e.g., Ho & MacDorman,
2010), because this study required many stimuli to be rated. The
categorization tasks preceded the task stimuli ratings to reduce bias
from exposure to the warmth and eeriness indices.
3. Results
3.1. Plots of percentage categorized as real, eeriness, warmth, and
response times
For each group and transition, Fig. 4 plots the percentage of
times the stimulus was categorized as real (vs. computer animated)
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Fig. 6. For humans, animals, and objects, reverse-scaled warmth ratings of the stimulus are plotted against its fraction of real for the control (diagonal) and consistency-
reduced transitions (lower right, upper left).
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feature sets. For humans and animals, the percentage increased
with fraction of real, approximating a logistic function. For
humans, a lack of realism was more noticeable for the
consistency-reduced transitions than for the control, as indicated
by the rightward shift in the curve. Distinguishing real from com-
puter animatedwas easier for humans and animals than for objects.
Figs. 5 and 6 show that for humans and animals on the control
transition, the 3D computer models were always the eeriest and
coldest; perceived eeriness fell markedly, and warmth rose, as frac-
tion of real increased. For humans on the consistency-reduced
transitions, less realism in the eyes, eyelashes, and mouth
increased eeriness and coldness disproportionately compared with
the skin, nose, and eyebrows (as indicated by the area below the
solid line and above the dashed line in the lower-right and the
upper-left transitions). For all groups, the eeriest and coldest
stimulus was the most certain (diamond), not the most ambiguous
(unfilled circle). Reducing consistency in realism increasedeeriness, and tended to decrease warmth, for humans and animals
but not for objects.
Fig. 7 shows that response times were slower for more
ambiguous stimuli. Response times were significantly faster for 3D
computer models of humans and animals than of objects. Thus, in
the high and intermediate anthropomorphismgroups, a lack of real-
ismwasmore noticeable than in the low anthropomorphism group.3.2. Data analysis preliminaries
Test statistics were interpreted with a significance threshold of
a = .05. Response times were log10-transformed to remove their
positive skew before analysis. Linear Q–Q plots confirmed that
the collected data were normal. Effect sizes for manipulations were
calculated using partial eta-squared g2p
 
and interpreted accord-
ing to the following thresholds: small = .01, medium = .06, and
large = .14; effect sizes for differences between means were
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Fig. 7. For humans, animals, and objects, the mean response time in milliseconds for the categorization of the stimulus are plotted against its fraction of real for the control
(diagonal) and consistency-reduced transitions (lower right, upper left). The darker bar indicates the most ambiguous stimulus, and the lighter bar indicates the most certain.
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ing thresholds: small = .20, medium = .50, and large = .80; effect
sizes for chi-squared tests were calculated using / and interpreted
according to the following thresholds: small = .10, medium = .30,
and large = .50 (Cohen, 1992). All reported pairwise comparisons
reflect Bonferroni–Holm correction. When Mauchly’s Test of
Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not
met, we reported adjusted degrees-of-freedom using the Green-
house–Geisser correction.
For data analysis we collapsed across each entity and investi-
gated the three transitions: diagonal, lower right, and upper left.
For testing H1 we conducted within-group, repeated-measures
ANOVAs with fraction of real as the only factor. In a preliminary
analysis, we modeled the data in each transition using a linear
mixed-effects model with fraction of real as the fixed factor and
entity as the random factor. The model showed entity had little
effect (Supplementary Material, Section 1). Thus, we tested H1and H2 with only the fixed factor—fraction of real. H3 was tested
with a mixed-design ANOVA using two fixed factors—consistency
in realism (reduced or control, the within-group factor) and level
of anthropomorphism (low, medium, or high, the between-group
factor). Because our preliminary analysis found similar responses
on the animacy (living vs. inanimate) and the realism (computer ani-
mated vs. real) transitions, we only report responses for realism
(see Appendix A.1). Correlations among the four indices (subjective
eeriness, warmth, animacy, and realism) are reported in Appendix
A.2, and a manipulation check of the effect of fraction of real on
subjective realism ratings in Appendix A.3.
3.3. Testing H1
3.3.1. Human models
For the six human models in the high anthropomorphism group
(n = 1172), three within-group, repeated-measures ANOVAs
200 K.F. MacDorman, D. Chattopadhyay / Cognition 146 (2016) 190–205confirmed that fraction of real significantly affected eeriness
ratings for all three transitions with a large effect size: diagonal,
F(3.30,3829) = 511, MSE = 3.20, p < .001, g2p ¼ :31; lower right,
F(3.41,3941) = 528, MSE = 3.25, p < .001, g2p ¼ :31; and upper
left, F(3.71,4307) = 418, MSE = 2.82, p < .001, g2p ¼ :27. For each
transition, pairwise comparisons showed that the most ambiguous
stimulus was significantly less eerie than the eeriest stimulus:
diagonal, t(1160) = 512, p < .001, d = 0.72; lower right, t(1155)
= 295, p < .001, d = 0.57; and upper left, t(1160) = 407, p < .001,
d = 0.67. Fraction of real also significantly affected warmth
ratings for each transition: diagonal, F(3.34,3879) = 364,
MSE = 1.96, p < .001, g2p ¼ :24; lower right, F(3.65,4222) =
348, MSE = 1.83, p < .001, g2p ¼ :23; and upper left, F(3.84,4457) =
303, MSE = 1.63, p < .001, g2p ¼ :21. For each transition, pairwise
comparisons showed that the most ambiguous stimulus was
significantly warmer than the coldest stimulus: diagonal, t(1160)
= 335, p < .001, d = 0.57; lower right, t(1156) = 223, p < .001,
d = 0.46; and upper left, t(1162) = 401, p < .001, d = 0.62.
3.3.2. Animal models
For the two animal models (n = 448), fraction of real
significantly affected eeriness ratings for all three transitions with
a large effect size: diagonal, F(3.57,1569) = 184, MSE = 3.29,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :30; lower right, F(3.91,1732) = 153, MSE =
2.98, p < .001, g2p ¼ :26; and upper left, F(3.56,1570) = 162,
MSE = 3.37, p < .001, g2p ¼ :27. For each transition, pairwise com-
parisons showed that the most ambiguous stimulus was signifi-
cantly less eerie than the eeriest stimulus: diagonal, t(440) = 225,
p < .001, d = 0.86; lower right, t(443) = 87.49, p < .001, d = 0.46;
and upper left, t(441) = 146, p < .001, d = 0.72. Fraction of real also
significantly affected warmth ratings for each transition with a
large effect size: F(4.3,1897) = 157, MSE = 1.66, p < .001, g2p ¼ :26;
lower right, F(4.33,1923) = 162, MSE = 1.57, p < .001, g2p ¼ :27;
and upper left, F(3.59,1590) = 168, MSE = 2.03, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :28. For each transition, pairwise comparisons showed that
the most ambiguous stimulus was significantly warmer than the
coldest stimulus: diagonal, t(441) = 223, p < .001, d = 0.71; lower
right, t(444) = 113, p < .001, d = 0.48; and upper left, t(442) = 120,
p < .001, d = 0.57.
3.3.3. Object models
For the four object models (n = 610), fraction of real signifi-
cantly affected eeriness ratings for all three transitions with a small
effect size: diagonal, F(5.04,3040) = 14.14, MSE = 0.87, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :02; lower right, F(4.86,2948) = 14.66, MSE = 0.96, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :02; and upper left, F(4.96,3015) = 11.36, MSE = 0.92,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :02. For each transition, pairwise comparisons
showed that the most ambiguous stimulus was significantly less
eerie than the eeriest stimulus: diagonal, t(603) = 17.27, p < .001,
d = 0.16; lower right, t(607) = 9.59, p = .002, d = 0.12; and upper
left, t(608) = 21.35, p < .001, d = 0.18. Fraction of real also signifi-
cantly affected warmth ratings for each transition with a small
effect size: diagonal, F(4.78,2882) = 19.00, MSE = 0.52, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :03; lower right, F(4.88,2960) = 20.32, MSE = 0.51, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :03; and upper left, F(4.84,2942) = 21.21, MSE = 0.48,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :03. For each transition, pairwise comparisons
showed that the most ambiguous stimulus was significantly
warmer than the coldest stimulus: diagonal, t(603) = 12.57,
p < .001, d = 0.14; lower right, t(607) = 21.39, p < .001, d = 0.16;
and upper left, t(608) = 26.66, p < .001, d = 0.18.
These results support H1. For all three groups—humans,
animals, and objects—the most ambiguous stimulus was neitherthe eeriest (Fig. 5) nor the coldest (Fig. 6). This pattern held for
all three levels of anthropomorphism (humans, animals, and
objects) and for all three transitions. Instead, the 0% real stimulus,
which rated lowest in realism, was always the eeriest and coldest.
It also had the fastest response time (Fig. 7). Appendix B reports
how fraction of real affected response times.
3.4. Testing H2
Consistency reduced is defined as two (or more) sets of features
that differ in their level of realism, operationalized in this experi-
ment as fraction of real. Stimuli on the diagonal transition are con-
trol stimuli, while paired stimuli on the lower-right and upper-left
transitions are consistency reduced relative to their controls. For
each level of anthropomorphism (humans, animals, and objects),
the main effect of reduced consistency in realism was tested. The
effects of reduced consistency were also tested for paired stimuli
on the diagonal and lower-right transition and on the diagonal
and upper-left transition.
3.4.1. Human models
For the six human models, reduced consistency in realism
significantly affected eeriness ratings for both the lower-right,
t(5841) = 22.19, p < .001, d = 0.26, and upper-left transition,
t(5846) = 11.22, p < .001, d = 0.13, compared with the diagonal
transition with a small effect size. Pairwise comparisons showed
that reduced consistency significantly increased eeriness for all
paired stimuli in the lower-right transition and for three-fifths of
the stimuli in the upper-left transition (Appendix C, Tables C1
and C2). Reduced consistency in realism also significantly affected
warmth ratings for both transitions: lower right, t(5840) = 18.38,
p < .001, d = 0.20; and upper left, t(5846) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 0.05.
Pairwise comparisons showed that reduced consistency signifi-
cantly decreased warmth for four-fifths of the stimuli in the
lower-right transition, and three-fifths of the stimuli in the
upper-left transition (Appendix C, Tables C3 and C4). In sum,
reduced consistency in realism increased the uncanny valley effect
for all consistency-reduced stimuli, except one in the lower-right
transition (0–⅓ foreground–background fraction of real) and two
in the upper-left transition (⅔–0 and ⅓–0).
3.4.2. Animal models
For the two animal models, reduced consistency in realism also
significantly affected eeriness ratings for both the lower-right, t
(2229) = 7.72, p < .001, d = 0.14, and upper-left transition, t(2224)
= 11.42, p < .001, d = 0.24, compared with the diagonal transition
with a small effect size. Pairwise comparisons showed that reduced
consistency significantly increased eeriness in three-fifths of the
stimuli in the lower-right transition and four-fifths of the stimuli
in the upper-left transition (Appendix C, Tables C5 and C6).
Reduced consistency in realism also significantly affected warmth
ratings in both the lower-right, t(2234) = 2.62, p = .009, d = 0.04
and upper-left transitions, t(2229) = 10.79, p < .001, d = 0.21.
Pairwise comparisons showed that reduced consistency in realism
significantly decreased warmth in one-fifth of the stimuli in the
lower-right transition and four-fifths of the stimuli in the upper-
left transition (Appendix C, Tables C7 and C8). In sum, reduced
consistency in realism increased the uncanny valley effect in only
one consistency-reduced stimulus in the lower-right transition
(0–1 foreground–background fraction of real) and in all but two
consistency-reduced stimuli in the upper-left transition (1–⅔
and ⅓–0).
3.4.3. Object models
By contrast, for the object models, reduced consistency in real-
ism did not significantly affect eeriness ratings in the lower-right
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upper-left transition, t(3044) = 2.21, p = .027, d = 0.03, compared
with the diagonal transition. Reduced consistency significantly
affected warmth ratings in the lower-right transition, t(3043)
= 2.55, p = .011, d = 0.04, but did not in the upper-left transition, t
(3044) = 1.95, p = .051, d = 0.03. However, for all these conditions,
the effect size was negligible. Furthermore, no pairwise compar-
isons showed significant effects of reduced consistency on eeriness
or warmth in either the lower-right or upper-left transition.
These results support H2. Reduced consistency in realism
caused a small uncanny valley effect in high and intermediate
anthropomorphism groups (humans, animals); however, the effect
in the low anthropomorphism group (objects) was negligible.
3.5. Testing H3
For testing H3 we analyzed outcomes of two entities (dog and
parrot, n = 2240) from round 1, four entities (Clint, Emelie, Juliana,
and Simona, n = 3620) from round 2, and three entities (camera,
washer, and water lily, n = 2145) from round 3. Reduced consis-
tency in realism was treated as a within-group factor, and level
of anthropomorphism a between-group factor. A mixed-design
ANOVA (anthropomorphism: low, medium, or high  realism con-
sistency: control or reduced) confirmed that the level of anthropo-
morphism significantly affected the difference in eeriness ratings
between control stimuli (diagonal transition) and consistency-
reduced stimuli for both the lower-right, F(2,7983) = 51.76,
MSE = 1.11, p < .001, g2 = .03, and the upper-left transition, F
(2,7982) = 32.11, MSE = 1.12, p < .001, g2 = .02, with a small effect
size. These results indicate that reduced consistency in realism
affected eeriness ratings of humans, animals, and objects differ-
ently (Fig. 8).
For the lower-right transition, a post hoc Tukey’s honest signif-
icant difference (HSD) test found that reduced consistency in real-
ism increased eeriness significantly more for humans than for
animals and significantly more for animals than for objects,
p < .001. For the upper-left transition, a post hoc Tukey’s HSD
found that reduced consistency increased eeriness significantly
more for humans than for objects and significantly more for ani-
mals than for objects, p < .001. However, reduced consistency
increased eeriness significantly less for humans than for animals,
p < .001.0.5
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.5
0.0
1.0
1.5
Humans
Animals
Objects
Humans
Animals
Objects
Ee
rin
es
s
W
ar
m
th
, R
ev
er
se
 S
ca
le
d
Control Transition (Diagonal)
Consistency-reduced Transition (Lower Right)
Consistency-reduced Transition (Upper Left)
–
–
–
–
Fig. 8. Perceived eeriness and reverse-scaled warmth ratings are plotted against the
level of anthropomorphism (high: humans, intermediate: animals, and low:
objects) for the control (diagonal) and consistency-reduced transitions (lower
right, upper left).A mixed-design ANOVA also confirmed that the level of
anthropomorphism significantly affected the difference in warmth
ratings between control stimuli and consistency-reduced stimuli
for both the lower-right, F(2,7982) = 46.62, MSE = 0.70, p < .001,
g2 = .01, and the upper-left transition, F(2,7982) = 56.87,
MSE = 0.73, p < .001, g2 = .01, with a small effect size. For the
lower-right transition, a post hoc Tukey’s HSD found that reduced
consistency decreased warmth significantly more for humans than
for animals and objects, p < .001. However, reduced consistency did
not decreasewarmth significantlymore for animals than for objects,
p = .483. For the upper-left transition, a post hoc Tukey’s HSD found
that reduced consistency decreased warmth significantly more for
animals than for objects, p < .001. However, reduced consistency
decreased warmth significantly less for humans than for animals,
p < .001. Reduced consistency did not decreased warmth signifi-
cantly more for humans than for objects, p = .067.
H3 states that the more anthropomorphic the entity, the more
reduced consistency in feature realism increases the uncanny
valley effect. H3 was supported for three of six comparisons (three
levels of anthropomorphism  two transitions). H3 was not sup-
ported in comparing humans and animals in the upper-left transi-
tion, humans and objects in the upper-left transition, and animals
and objects in the lower-right transition.3.6. Additional findings
The estimated point of greatest ambiguity and the slowest
response time shifted rightward, toward real, for the consistency-
reduced transitions compared with the control transition (Figs. 4
and 7, respectively). For the diagonal, the slowest response time
was the midpoint (½–½ foreground–background fraction of real);
however, the point to its right was significantly slower for the
lower-right (⅓–1 vs. 0–1: t[2957] = 6.92, p < .001, d = 0.11) and
upper-left transition (1–⅓ vs. 1–0: t[2955] = 8.05, p < .001,
d = 0.16). Thus, reduced consistency in realism makes humans
and animals look less real.
Furthermore, in humans, eyes, eyelashes, and mouth more
effectively signal a lack of realism as indicated by significantly fas-
ter response times for the lower-right transition compared with
the diagonal, t(2957) = 1.45, p < .001, d = 0.10. A lack of objective
realism in the eyes, eyelashes, and mouth (lower right: 0–⅓,
0–⅔, and 0–1) increased eeriness (t[1162] = 11.68, p < .001,
d = 0.27) and decreased warmth (t[1164] = 11.53, p < .001,
d = 0.24) significantly more than a lack of objective realism in the
skin, nose, and eyebrows (upper left: ⅓–0, ⅔–0, and 1–0, Figs. 5
and 6).4. Discussion
4.1. Support for realism inconsistency, not category uncertainty
Several authors have proposed that the uncanny valley effect is
caused by category uncertainty (Burleigh et al., 2013; Green et al.,
2008; Jentsch, 1906; Kang, 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009; Yamada et al., 2013). However, this study could find no evi-
dence to support that. In a categorization task on animacy (living
vs. inanimate) and realism (computer animated vs. real), the eeriest
and coldest stimuli were those categorized with the most
certainty: the 3D computer models of humans and animals
(Figs. 4–6). They were also the stimuli the participants categorized
the fastest (Fig. 7). The high processing fluency of uncanny stimuli
is significant given that Yamada et al. (2013) attributed the
uncanny valley effect to low processing fluency.
If category uncertainty were the cause of the uncanny valley
effect, as objective realism increased, eeriness should have peaked
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then declined. On the contrary, at the most ambiguous stimulus,
the slope was negative and relatively steep (Fig. 5). As the most
ambiguous stimulus was neither the eeriest nor the coldest for
all groups and transitions, H1 is supported.
This study next tested the predictions of an alternative theory,
that realism inconsistency causes the uncanny valley effect
(MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009; Mitchell et al., 2011; Moore, 2012). Specifically, we proposed
that, in anthropomorphic entities, features with inconsistent levels
of objective realism cause brain processes to make conflicting
inferences about the entity, resulting in large feedback error sig-
nals. Reduced consistency in feature realism increased eeriness
and decreased warmth for humans and animals (Fig. 8). These
effects were negligible for objects. Thus, H2 is supported.
We also proposed that the more anthropomorphic the entity
the more reduced consistency in feature realism increases the
uncanny valley effect. This hypothesis was supported for three of
six comparisons. Thus, H3 is partially supported.
4.2. Features contributing to the uncanny valley effect
The eyes, eyelashes, and mouth increase eeriness and decrease
warmth more than the rest of the face. This is a compelling result
given that they cover a much smaller area. Participants may be
more sensitive to the eyes, eyelashes, and mouth because of their
role in (a) primate reproduction, (b) social communication, includ-
ing joint attention, (c) the encoding of faces in memory, and (d)
visual processing in the brain, and (e) because interlocutors spent
more time looking at the eyes than at other facial features
(Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Emery, 2000; Fox &
Damjanovic, 2006; Looser & Wheatley, 2010; McKelvie, 1976;
Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; Quinsey, Ketsetzis,
Earls, & Karamanoukian, 1996).
The perceptual processing of faces may also exhibit an asymme-
trywhereby high skin realism elicits neurocognitive expectancies of
high eye realism but not vice versa (MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009;
MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009). This would also explain why
makeup does not detract from facial attractiveness (Etcoff, Stock,
Haley, Vickery, & House, 2011; Mulhern, Fieldman, Hussey,
Lévêque, & Pineau, 2003) but a dead person’s eyes do. Previous
research found a similar asymmetrywhereby skin realism increased
sensitivity to deviations from typical facial proportions
(MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009; MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al.,
2009).
4.3. Why the 3D models were the eeriest
As expected, the 3D computer models were universally eerier
and colder than photographs of their real counterparts. This pat-
tern held even when the 3D computer models were made more
attractive with makeup or when the actual person (81-year-old
Zlatko) had more wrinkles and blemishes than the model (Fink,
Grammer, & Thornhill, 2001; Fink et al., 2008; Jones, Little, Burt,
& Perrett, 2004). As also expected, for humans and animals,
eeriness followed an inverse logistic function for the realism–
consistent transition (MacDorman, Green, et al., 2009;
MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009). Our assumption is that the
process of computer sculpting, texturing, and rendering 3D models
introduces extraneous realism inconsistency. Although we were
unable to eliminate this confound with professional artistry and
digital makeup, the same holds for large film studios (Butler &
Joschko, 2009; Freedman, 2012).
In addition, entities in the uncanny valley may appropriate an
avoidance mechanism targeted at human and other animal threats
(MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006a;Mori, 1970/2012); for example, the‘dead eyes’ of a 3D computer model, by resembling those of a
corpse, could elicit aversive responses from a fear or disgust system
to prevent contact with potential vectors of infection. MacDorman
and Entezari (2015) found correlational support for the threat-
avoidance theory in a study on individual differences. Sensitivity
to reminders of mortality predicted significantly higher eeriness
and lower warmth ratings of realism-inconsistent android robots.
In other words, the uncanny valley effect was stronger in individu-
als who felt more disturbed by such events as touching dead bodies,
walking through graveyards, and sleeping in a dead man’s room.
The uncanny valley hypothesis predicts a negative emotional
appraisal of entities that appear and behave not quite human.
The effect was in fact strongest when observing the least realistic
faces. We do not interpret this as refuting the hypothesis because
Mori positioned the uncanny valley to the left—or less human
side—of entities that are clearly not human (e.g., a doll, okinamask,
and bunraku puppet in Fig. 3 of Mori, 1970/2012). Mori never
argued that to be uncanny an entity must appear ambiguously
human. This view should instead be attributed to other authors
(Burleigh et al., 2013; Green et al., 2008; Kang, 2009;
MacDorman, Vasudevan, et al., 2009; Yamada et al., 2013).
Our findings indicate a need to explore broader continua of
stimuli, from abstract human representations, to 3D computer
models, to real people. There is also a need to investigate the
interplay between category uncertainty, realism inconsistency,
and animation. When the faces are animated, the bottom of the
valley could shift rightward, toward stimuli that are physically
more similar to human beings. But for still faces at least, the
findings indicate human character modelers should strive for
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A.1. Animacy vs. realism
In the first round of experiments, animacy (living vs. inanimate)
and realism (computer animated vs. real) categorizations and
response times followed a similar pattern. Plots of percentage cat-
egorized as real (vs. fraction of real) appeared nearly identical in
shape to plots of percentage categorized as living. The same pattern
Table C1
Pairwise comparisons of eeriness ratings for humans, diagonal vs. lower-right
transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. 0–⅓ 2.78 1167 .003 .025
⅓–⅓ vs. 0–⅔ 7.03 1167 <.001 .010
½–½ vs. 0–1 20.16 1168 <.001 .013
⅔–⅔ vs. ⅓–1 14.89 1168 <.001 .017
⅚–⅚ vs. ⅔–1 2.15 1167 .016 .050
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C2
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independence found the difference between percentage catego-
rized as real and percentage categorized as living to be significant
owing to the large number of trials, the effect size was negligible,
v2(1, n = 28,832) = 12.69, p < .001, / = .02. Thus, to avoid redun-
dancy animacy categorizations are not reported.
A.2. Correlation among indices
Table A1 reports the correlations among the four indices: sub-
jective eeriness, warmth, animacy, and realism. Animacy ratings
were only available from the first round of the experiments.
A.3. Realism manipulation
As a manipulation check, we conducted three within-group,
repeated-measures ANOVAs to investigate the effect of fraction
of real on subjective realism ratings for each of the three transi-
tions: diagonal, lower right, and upper left. (Participants rated
stimuli on realism in the first and the third round of the experi-
ment.) Subjective realism monotonically increased with fraction
of real, approximating the shape of a logistic function. For the
two human models, fraction of real significantly affected realism
ratings for all three transitions with a large effect size: diagonal,
F(4.18,1847) = 1427, MSE = 2.22, p < .001, g2p ¼ :76; lower right,
F(4.03,1785) = 1406, MSE = 2.14, p < .001, g2p ¼ :76; and upper left,
F(4.34,1926) = 1396, MSE = 1.88, p < .001, g2p ¼ :76. Similar results
were found for animals: diagonal, F(4.60,2028) = 1208,
MSE = 2.13, p < .001, g2p ¼ :73; lower right, F(4.83,2146) =
1003, MSE = 2.05, p < .001, g2p ¼ :69; and upper left, F(4.3,1904) =
1341, MSE = 1.94, p < .001, g2p ¼ :75; and for objects: diagonal,
F(3.99,1686) = 310, MSE = 2.85, p < .001, g2p ¼ :42; lower right,
F(4.14,1768) = 255, MSE = 3.27, p < .001, g2p ¼ :37; and upper
left, F(3.70,1580) = 286, MSE = 3.20, p < .001, g2p ¼ :40. Realism
sensitivity increased with anthropomorphism. These results
confirm that the fraction-of-real manipulation was perceived by
participants.
Appendix B. Effects of fraction of real on response times
B.1. Human models
For the six humanmodels in the high anthropomorphism group,
fraction of real had a significant main effect on log-RTs for each
transition with a medium effect size (Fig. 7, top row): diagonal,
F(5.67,16,764) = 248, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, g2p ¼ :08; lower right,
F(5.61,16,708) = 186, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, g2p ¼ :06; and upper
left, F(5.74,16,955) = 217, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, g2p ¼ :07. For each
transition, pairwise comparisons showed that the log-RT for the
most ambiguous stimulus was significantly longer (ps < .001) than
all but one stimulus (namely, ⅔–⅔ foreground–background frac-
tion of real for the diagonal, ⅔–1 for the lower-right, and 1–⅔ for
the upper-left transition). (Eyes, eyelashes, and mouth are fore-
ground for humans, and skin, nose, and eyebrows are background.)Table A1
Correlations among eeriness, warmth, animacy, and realism.
Eeriness Warmth Animacy
Warmth .37***
Animacy .06 .43***
Realism .15*** .12*** .81***
*** p < .001 (2-tailed).B.2. Animal models
Fraction of real had a significant main effect on the log-RTs for
each transition with a medium effect size (Fig. 7, middle row):
diagonal, F(5.62,5022) = 91.81, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, g2p ¼ :09;
lower right, F(5.69,5085) = 82.51, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, g2p ¼ :09;
and upper left, F(5.63,5027) = 90.34, MSE = 0.02, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :09. For each transition, pairwise comparisons showed that
the log-RT for the most ambiguous stimulus was significantly
longer (ps < .001) than for all but one stimulus (⅔–⅔ fore-
ground–background fraction of real for the diagonal, ⅓–1 for the
lower-right, and 1–⅔ for the upper-left transition).B.3. Object models
Although fraction of real had a significant main effect on log-
RTs in each transition, the effect size was negligible (Fig. 7, bottom
row): diagonal, F(5.94,8130) = 3.22, MSE = 0.02, p = .004, g2p ¼ :00;
lower right, F(5.86,8027) = 3.07, MSE = 0.03, p < .01, g2p ¼ :00; and
upper left, F(5.92,8099) = 6.15, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, g2p ¼ :00.
Unlike in humans and animals, pairwise comparisons showed that
the log-RT for the most ambiguous stimulus was only significantly
longer than the 0% real stimulus in the diagonal and lower-right
transition (ps < .001) but significantly longer than four stimuli in
the upper-left transition: 0–0, ⅓–0, ⅔–0, and 1–0 foreground–
background fraction of real (ps < .01).Appendix C. Detailed pairwise comparisons for testing H2
For Tables C1–C8, per-test a was set using the Bonferroni-Holm
correction. Boldface indicates the consistency-reduced stimulus
was significantly eerier or colder for the compared foreground–
background fractions of real.C.1. Human models
See Tables C1–C4.Pairwise comparisons of eeriness ratings for humans, diagonal vs. upper-left
transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. ⅓–0 1.43 1168 .077 .050
⅓–⅓ vs. ⅔–0 2.97 1167 .002 .025
½–½ vs. 1–0 10.28 1168 <.001 .010
⅔–⅔ vs. 1–⅓ 13.85 1170 <.001 .013
⅚–⅚ vs. 1–⅔ 5.22 1169 <.001 .017
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C3
Pairwise comparisons of warmth ratings for humans, diagonal vs. lower-right transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. 0–⅓ 0.63 1168 .264 .050
⅓–⅓ vs. 0–⅔ 6.38 1167 <.001 .010
½–½ vs. 0–1 15.51 1168 <.001 .013
⅔–⅔ vs. ⅓–1 13.32 1167 <.001 .017
⅚–⅚ vs. ⅔–1 3.11 1166 .001 .025
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C4
Pairwise comparisons of warmth ratings for humans, diagonal vs. upper-left transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. ⅓–0 1.98 1169 .024 .050
⅓–⅓ vs. ⅔–0 3.45 1167 .001 .017
½–½ vs. 1–0 4.35 1168 <.001 .010
⅔–⅔ vs. 1–⅓ 8.68 1169 <.001 .013
⅚–⅚ vs. 1–⅔ 2.64 1169 .004 .025
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
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See Tables C5–C8.Table C5
Pairwise comparisons of eeriness ratings for animals, diagonal vs. lower-right transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. 0–⅓ 0.89 445 .186 .050
⅓–⅓ vs. 0–⅔ 1.48 446 .070 .025
½–½ vs. 0–1 7.76 446 <.001 .010
⅔–⅔ vs. ⅓–1 5.66 445 <.001 .013
⅚–⅚ vs. ⅔–1 2.92 443 .002 .017
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C6
Pairwise comparisons of eeriness ratings for animals, diagonal vs. upper-left transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. ⅓–0 1.06 444 .146 .050
⅓–⅓ vs. ⅔–0 3.11 446 .001 .017
½–½ vs. 1–0 9.67 444 <.001 .010
⅔–⅔ vs. 1–⅓ 7.91 444 <.001 .013
⅚–⅚ vs. 1–⅔ 2.54 442 .006 .025
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C7
Pairwise comparisons of warmth ratings for animals, diagonal vs. lower-right transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. 0–⅓ 0.93 446 .178 .025
⅓–⅓ vs. 0–⅔ 1.99 447 .024 .013
½–½ vs. 0–1 5.04 447 <.001 .010
⅔–⅔ vs. ⅓–1 1.29 446 .100 .017
⅚–⅚ vs. ⅔–1 0.40 444 .343 .050
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.
Table C8
Pairwise comparisons of warmth ratings for animals, diagonal vs. upper-left transition.
Comparison t value df p value a level
⅙–⅙ vs. ⅓–0 2.56 445 .006 .025
⅓–⅓ vs. ⅔–0 4.05 447 <.001 .010
½–½ vs. 1–0 9.73 445 <.001 .013
⅔–⅔ vs. 1–⅓ 6.98 445 <.001 .017
⅚–⅚ vs. 1–⅔ 0.17 443 .433 .050
Boldface indicates significance with Bonferroni-Holm correction.Appendix D. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.
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